Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth-functions: truth-functions map truth-values onto other truth-values. In two-valued logic, the two available truth values are "true" or "false" (t/f). The disjunction (A or B) now maps (t or t), (t or f) and (f or t) onto t, and (f or f) onto f. Non-truth-functional semantics differ from truth-functional semantics in that they also take other meanings of the logical links ("and", "or", "if then") into account, for example, expressions such as "nevertheless," "though," "still", whose propositional content corresponds to the "and", but which bring a certain additional expressive force into play. See also truth-functional semantics, truth-conditional semantics, semantics, propositional content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Laurence Jonathan Cohen on Truth Functions - Dictionary of Arguments
Meggle I 409 Non-truthfunctional/Cohen: E.g., "If I have a king of hearts, I'm glad." Not because there is no implication of indirect reasons (the implication is there) but because there is an implication of a connection between the anterior and posterior clause. I 410 Semantic Hypothesis/Cohen: it corresponds perfectly to such cases. >Implicature/Cohen. E.g., if someone points to a picture and says: "That's a hand", it is clear that a painted hand is meant. E.g., "If he was surprised, he did not show i.t" If that were to be truth-functional, then that would be acceptable because the consequence is true, but then one still does not have to accept the inversion: If he wasn't surprised, he didn't show surprise. One does not have to accept this, although the consequence here would also be true. Reason: "if" here has the meaning "even if", and not of "if, then". >Implicature/Cohen. L.Jonathan Cohen, Die logischen Partikel der natürlichen Sprache. In: Georg Meggle (Hrsg.) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt 1979_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
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> Counter arguments against Cohen
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Functions
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29